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We  present  considerations  on  the  content  of  the  safety  analysis  report  for innovative  ESNII  reactors.
The  innovative  ESNII  reactor  concepts  require  identiﬁcation  of  safety  objectives  and  engineering  design  requirements.
For  innovative  plant  designs  the SAR  should  clearly  address  all  safety  aspects  to help  the regulatory’s  safety  evaluation.
It is recommended  that  parts  of  the  SAR  be discussed  with  the regulatory  body  at an  early  stage.
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. Safety and risk analysis
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In view  of  the potential  deployment  of  demonstrators  and  prototypes  associated  with  the  European
Sustainable  Nuclear  Industrial  Initiative  (ESNII),  the  present  licensing  framework,  based  on the current
Light  Water  Reactor  (LWR)  technology,  will  have  to  adjust  as  necessary  taking  into  account  to  the  new
safety  aspects  introduced  by  these  innovative  technologies.  Within  the  SARGEN  IV project  under  the
Euratom  Framework  Programme  FP7,  an extensive  work  has  been  done  to review  the  critical  safety
features  of  the  reactor  concepts  developed  under  ESNII.  This review  has  also  been  used as  a reference  to
provide  guidelines  on  the  structure  and  content  of  the  Safety  Analysis  Report  (SAR)  for the  innovative
ESNII  reactors.  Structure  and  content  of a  SAR  generally  differ  among  countries.  The  approach  followed
to  give  recommendations  and  guidance  was  to adopt  as  far as possible  the format  of the  current  practices
for LWR  based  on  the  US  NRC  Reg  Guide  1.70  together  with  IAEA  publication  GS-G-4.1  and  to  identify
those  chapters  whose  subjects  need  to be  adapted  to the  speciﬁc  design.  Due  to the  innovative  nature
of  the  design,  the  licensing  process  for new  ESNII concepts  may  take  longer.  The  early  involvement  of
regulators  in deﬁning  safety  objectives  and  criteria  and  acceptable  solutions  to meet  these  criteria  may  be
beneﬁcial  to shorten  this  process.  Therefore,  it is  recommended  that  parts  of the  SAR  should  be  submitted
to  the  regulatory  body  at an  early  stage  and  in  accordance  with  an  agreed  timetable;  this  approach  will
permit  a smoother  review  process  and  help  preventing  unnecessary  delays.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. IntroductionIn order to obtain the approval (license) to build and operate a
uclear power plant, the applicant is normally required to submit
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a detailed demonstration of safety, which is usually reviewed and
assessed by the regulatory body in accordance with clearly deﬁned
national procedures. The regulatory body usually issues guidance
on the format and content of documents to be submitted by the
operator in support of applications for authorization. The operator
is generally required to submit or make available to the regulatory
body, in accordance with agreed timetable, all information that is
speciﬁed or requested. This information should be presented in the
 article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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orm of a report, hereinafter referred to as a safety analysis report
SAR).
The particular contents of the SAR will depend on the speciﬁc
ype and design of the nuclear power plant in question. The require-
ents depend strongly on the type of regulatory regime adopted by
 State that may  affect the scope and depth of the information pre-
ented in the SAR. In any event, there should be a dialogue between
he regulator and the operator at an early stage already to agree
n what is necessary to demonstrate the required level of safety
f any proposed installation and the programme of submissions.
ince the ESNII concepts are prototypes or demonstrators, system
esigners and vendors (if not the same as the operator) should
referably also be involved in these discussions with the regulator
IAEA, 2004). These discussions should start as early as possible,
referably already during a conceptual design stage (cf. ASTRID
afety Orientations & Options Files). Some countries give a very
rescriptive guidance on the contents of a SAR, like, for instance,
he Standard Format produced by the United States Nuclear Reg-
latory Commission (US NRC, 1978). Given that several countries
trongly rely on this format, the present document draws heavily on
ts content together with other publications (IAEA, 2004, 2012a,b;
S NRC, 2007a,b) to present a possible format and content option
or a comprehensive SAR for a European Sustainable Nuclear Indus-
rial Initiative (ESNII) type of innovative nuclear power plant. Albeit
ith applications to light-water reactors primarily in mind, we note
hat the similar format and content option has been proposed also
y SÚJB (2010).
The objective of this paper is to provide recommendations and
uidance on the possible format and content of a SAR in support
f a request to the regulatory body for authorization to construct
nd/or operate an innovative nuclear power plant under ESNII. If
n alternative format is used, the recommendations presented here
ight at least be considered as suggestions.
This proposal is based on outcomes of the SARGEN IV coordi-
ation action project, co-ﬁnanced by the Euratom 7th Framework
rogramme (FP7) (SARGEN IV, 2011). SARGEN IV considered four
ast reactor systems of ESNII (Fig. 1):
 Sodium cooled Fast Reactor (SFR);
 Lead cooled Fast Reactor (LFR);
 Gas cooled Fast Reactor (GFR); and
 Fast Spectrum Irradiation Facility, i.e. FAst Spectrum Transmuta-
tion Experimental Facility (FASTEF), alias MYRRHA.
. General considerations
The SAR forms an important part of the basis for licensing a
uclear power plant and an important part of the basis for the
afe operation of a plant. The deployment of innovative Generation
V reactor systems (GIF, 2014) brings a new series of challenging
icensing aspects that should be considered taking into account new
oolants and materials, innovative technologies and the accom-
anying, new safety issues (e.g. chemical reactivity of coolant).
he SAR should therefore contain accurate and sufﬁciently precise
nformation on the plant and its operating conditions and should
ypically include information on, for example, safety requirements,
he design basis, site and plant characteristics, operational limits
nd conditions, and safety analyses in such a way  that the regula-
ory body will be able to evaluate independently the safety of the
lant. In addition, it should be demonstrated that the interdepen-
ence between the safety aspects of technical factors and human
actors has been considered throughout the report. The SAR should
e presented in a form that additional information for nuclear
nd radiation safety assessment to allow the authorization pro-
ess to proceed is minimized. The SAR may  refer to more detailedg and Design 300 (2016) 452–466 453
supplementary information, which should be made available to the
regulatory body, if requested.
It is common practice in many countries that SARs are issued
in successive and complementary parts, which may  include (IAEA,
2004):
a) An initial (preliminary) SAR (PSAR) or pre-construction SAR
(PCSAR) that supports the application for authorization for
siting and/or construction.
b) An updated (intermediate) SAR or pre-operation SAR (POSAR)
that, in the licensing process, precedes an application for autho-
rization to operate. In some countries, licensing arrangements
envisage the issue of formal permission for the commission-
ing of a nuclear power plant. In such cases, this intermediate
version of the SAR, amended as a result of the primary
regulatory review of the PSAR (or PCSAR), should be sub-
mitted to the regulatory body in order to demonstrate the
readiness of the operating organization to start trial test-
ing operations of the plant before putting it into commercial
operation.
(c) A ﬁnalized (ﬁnal) SAR (FSAR) or station SAR (SSAR) that incorpo-
rates the revisions to the intermediate report prior to the plant
entering ﬁrst routine operation of the plant.
This document is mainly focused on the PSAR, as this consti-
tutes (especially for innovative plants) the basis of the safety case,
helping those planning to build a reactor (the applicant) and the
regulatory body to develop a common understanding of the nature
of the project and the likely regulatory requirements. The structure
of POSAR and FSAR could essentially follow that of the PSAR, with
veriﬁed/updated information provided.
In this respect, the initial report (PSAR) should include a
statement of the safety principles adopted and the safety objec-
tives set for the intended design. It should include a statement
of the manner of conforming to the fundamental safety princi-
ples and a statement of how the safety objectives are met. It
should typically contain sufﬁciently detailed information, speciﬁ-
cations, and supporting calculations to enable those responsible
for safety to assess whether the plant can be constructed and
operated in a manner that is acceptably safe throughout its life-
time. The safety features incorporated into the design, together
with the possible challenges to the plant that have been consid-
ered, should be described, with due regard to any site-speciﬁc
aspects.
Due to the innovative nature of the design, it is recommended
that parts of the SAR should be submitted to the regulatory body
at an early stage and in accordance with an agreed timetable; this
approach will permit a smoother review process and help prevent
unnecessary delays.
3. Format and content of SAR
3.1. Chapter 1: General design aspects, safety objectives and
engineering design requirements
The ﬁrst chapter of the SAR should include a general intro-
duction to the report and a general overview of the features that
characterize the new plant. The relevant mandatory national laws
and requirements from the authorities should be clearly recalled.
This chapter should allow the reader to have a ﬁrst basic overview
of the facility without the need to refer to the following chapters.
The assessment of the subsequent chapters can then be accom-
plished independently and with stronger emphasis on relative
safety importance of each individual item to the overall plant
design.
454 L. Ammirabile et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 300 (2016) 452–466
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Within the frame of safety objectives, the defence-in-depth
DiD) philosophy is introduced here, as it is one of the fundamen-
al principles in the nuclear industry (IAEA, 1996, 2012a,b). The
efence-in-depth concept is centred on several levels of protec-
ion, including successive barriers providing a graded (envelope)
rotection against a variety of transients. These transients include
hose resulting from equipment failure and/or human error, or from
nternal or external events that may  eventually lead to acciden-
al conditions. The graded (envelope) protection should prevent
he release of radioactive and hazardous material to the environ-
ent. Implementation of the defence-in-depth concept is mainly
arried out through deterministic analysis and the application
f sound engineering practices based on research and opera-
ional experience when available. This may  be supplemented with
robabilistic studies that would further provide a documented
ubstantiation that defence-in-depth implemented in the safety
rchitecture is exhaustive, progressive, tolerant, forgiving and bal-
nced (SARGEN IV, 2012).
In addition, the basis for the classiﬁcations of structures, sys-
ems and components (SSC) for purposes of analysis or design, the
cheme devised for the classiﬁcation, such as for seismic safety or
uclear safety, and the list of classes should be presented in this
hapter of the SAR. Information on the methods used to ensure
hat SSC are suitable for their design scope, remain ﬁt for purpose,
nd continue to perform any required safety function should be
learly presented. If there is a potential for structures or systems
o interact, details should be provided of the way in which it has
een ensured in the design that a plant provision of a lower class
r category cannot unduly impair the role of those with a higher
lassiﬁcation.
For innovative concepts, such as the ESNII systems, information
nd/or references need to be provided in particular for new features
nd technical solutions that accomplish safety functions and that
ight differ signiﬁcantly from Gen-II/III experience.
For LWRs, the indication of safety objectives and engineering
esign requirements (IAEA, 2012a,b) has become quite ‘standard’tors/prototypes.
in the nuclear power industry; therefore, it is generally not included
in the SAR. If not already prescribed by the regulatory body,
the SAR for innovative plant should describe and discuss the
safety objectives and the engineering design requirements and
standards of the structures, systems, and components and other
equipment important to safety (Doval et al., 2004) for designs char-
acterized by new coolant, new technology and new safety issues
(SARGEN IV, 2014). In particular, as any new-build project in the
European Union, the ESNII systems would need to adhere to safety
objectives as set out in the Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom
(as amended) on establishing a Community framework for the
nuclear safety of nuclear installations (Fig. 2) (Council of EU,
2014).
Among others, the safety objectives and engineering design
requirements may, include the following (IAEA, 1991, 2012a,b):
(a) Management system for consideration and implementation of
the requirements in all phases of the design process;
(b) High standard of engineering design and, in particular, conser-
vative design margins, engineered safety systems (features),
barriers to radionuclide transfer and protection of these barri-
ers;
(c) Inherent safety features i.e. achievement of safety through the
elimination or exclusion of inherent hazards;
(d) Passive safety features including either a system which is
composed entirely of passive components and structures or
a system which uses active components in a very limited way
to initiate subsequent passive operation (IAEA, 1991);
(e) The extent to which unique or unusual features that may  affect
the consequences or the probability of releases are incorpo-
rated;
(f) The extent to which redundancy, diversity, and indepen-
dence are applied in the design of engineered safety features,
also to protect against common cause and common mode
failures;
(g) Fail-safe features;
L. Ammirabile et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 300 (2016) 452–466 455
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(h) Defence-in-depth applied in the design;
(i) Accident prevention;
(j) Accident management;
(k) Proven engineering practice and use of generally accepted
standards;
(l) Assessment of human factors and dependent failures;
m)  Radiation protection.
The application of the Qualitative Safety Review (QSR) and
bjective Provision Tree (OPT) as indicated in the harmonized
afety practices (SARGEN IV, 2012) could also provide important
nsights for the deﬁnition of the speciﬁc design objectives and
equirements of the innovative reactor.
As indicated by WENRA (2013), new nuclear power plants
hould also to be designed with the objective of safety and secu-
ity interfaces ensuring that safety measures and security measures
re designed and implemented in an integrated manner. In agree-
ent with the ‘built-in rather than added-on’ principle (GIF, 2011),
uch measures should be thought of and implemented accordingly
efore the licensing process. Nevertheless, the description and the
ssessment of the security measures are not part of the SAR.
Finally, given the prototypical nature of ESNII systems, it is antic-
pated that several technical aspects require an adequate research
nd development programme to give assurance of the capability of
he safety features or components to perform as intended. The list of
ompleted and ongoing (to be completed before the issuance of an
perating license) R&D programmes should be presented together
ith a listing of those areas requiring further technical information
nd the sections in the SAR where a discussion on these topics can
e found.rds for innovative reactors.
3.2. Chapter 2: Site characteristics
This chapter of the SAR should provide information on the
geological, seismological, hydrological, radiological, and meteoro-
logical characteristics of the site and vicinity, in conjunction with
present and projected population distribution and land use and
nearby industrial, transportation, and defence site activities and
monitoring. The purpose is to indicate how these site characteris-
tics have inﬂuenced plant design and operating criteria and to show
the adequacy of the site characteristics from a safety viewpoint. If
a separate site evaluation report has been prepared, it should be
referenced and only a summary should be presented in this chapter.
In either cases information should be provided in sufﬁcient
detail to support the analysis and conclusions of Chapter 15 of the
SAR (see Section 3.15), to demonstrate that the reactor can be safely
operated at the proposed site. This information may include (IAEA,
2004):
(a) Site speciﬁc hazard evaluation for external events (of human or
natural origin);
b) Design targets in terms of recurrence probability of external
events;
(c) Deﬁnition of the design basis for external events;
d) Rare and severe hazards;
(e) Collection of site reference data for the plant design (geotech-
nical, seismological, volcanic, hydrological, radiological, and
meteorological);
(f) Evaluation of the impact of the site related issues to be consid-
ered in the parts of the SAR on emergency preparedness and
accident management;
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g) Arrangements for the monitoring of site related parameters
throughout the lifetime of the plant.
The possible combination of hazards (including rare and severe
azards) should also be taken into account.
For innovative concepts, multi-unit plants and co-location of
eactor and process heat facilities are commonly considered. As an
xample, in case of a process heat plant for hydrogen production,
he external hazard due to hydrogen explosion has to be taken into
ccount.
For FASTEF, aspects related to combined operation of the accel-
rator and reactor need to be carefully considered.
.3. Chapter 3: Design of systems, structures and components
This chapter should provide a description of all plant systems,
tructures and components (SSC) that are important to safety, a list
f industrial codes and standards that are intended to apply in SSC
esign, construction, and testing, and should provide a demonstra-
ion of their conformance to the design requirements. The level of
etail of each description should be commensurate with the safety
mportance of the item described. The information to be presented
n this chapter of the SAR will inevitably depend on the particu-
ar type and design of reactor selected for construction. However,
egardless of the reactor type and design, the sections for each par-
icular plant system should be organized to provide (US NRC, 1978;
AEA, 2004, 2012a,b):
a) A description of the system specifying the functional require-
ments and its safety, seismic, environmental, and quality
assurance (QA) classiﬁcations;
b) An engineering evaluation providing a demonstration that all
relevant functional requirements, requirements of industrial
codes and standards (if available), and regulatory requirements
have been considered adequately;
c) A safety assessment evidencing the technical basis on which
the system in question is judged capable to fulﬁl its intended
function. This judgement should be based on a combination of
demonstrated compliance with all applicable regulatory criteria
(by the use of regulatory guidance documents and, if avail-
able, industrial codes and standards) and/or demonstration by
means of analysis or testing that sufﬁcient design margins are
available.
For innovative reactor concepts, design codes and standards are
enerally not fully available or applicable and need to be further
eveloped, e.g. to take into account heavy liquid metal environ-
ental effects on mechanical properties of structural materials
MATTER, 2014). Speciﬁc analysis and/or testing program should
e presented to demonstrate that design margins are available for
hose SSCs whenever current design codes and standards are not
pplicable. Adequate R&D programmes should be referenced to
upport the demonstration.
.4. Chapter 4: Reactor
This chapter of the SAR should provide all the necessary infor-
ation to demonstrate that the reactor is capable of fulﬁlling the
undamental safety functions throughout its design lifetime under
ll normal operational modes, including both operating transient
nd steady state, anticipated operational occurrences and accident
onditions. The functions are (IAEA, 2004):
 Shutting down the reactor and maintaining it in a safe shutdown
condition for all operational states or accident conditions;g and Design 300 (2016) 452–466
– Providing for adequate removal of heat from the core after shut-
down, including in accident conditions;
– Containing radioactive and hazardous material to minimize its
release to the environment.
A summary description of the mechanical, nuclear, thermal, and
hydraulic designs of the various reactor components, including
the fuel, reactor vessel internals, and reactivity control systems,
should be given. The description should indicate the independent
and interrelated performance and safety functions of each compo-
nent. The important design and performance characteristics should
be included. A tabulation of analysis techniques used and load con-
ditions considered, including computer code names, should also be
included.
A description should be provided of the main elements of the
fuel system and reactor internals. It includes information about:
a) The details related to the geometry and isotopic content of the
ﬁssile and breeding fuel;
b) The structures into which the fuel has been assembled, e.g. the
fuel assembly or fuel bundle;
c) Components required for fuel positioning;
d) Absorber and reﬂector assemblies;
e) Shielding;
(f) All supporting elements internal to the reactor, including any
separate provisions for fuel location.
The description should also cover the safety substantiation for
the selected design bases.
For innovative fuel systems the safety substantiation should be
validated by reference to analytical tools and supporting experi-
mental data in fuel design and performance based on the speciﬁed
duty cycle of the system and in response of the fuel to transients.
Since the technology is new, particular attention needs to be
paid to quality assurance of material supply, fabrication, and weld-
ing techniques.
The behaviour of prototypic fuel at high burnup in prototypic
geometry needs to be presented.
The justiﬁcation for the design bases of the fuel system and inter-
nals should include, among others, a description of the design limits
and the functional characteristics in terms of the desired perfor-
mance under all relevant conditions, including normal operation,
anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions.
A description should be provided that demonstrates that the
reactivity control systems can fulﬁl their intended safety func-
tions under all foreseeable operating conditions. Basic information
should be provided on the design of reactivity control systems,
including materials, redundancy and diversity aspects, anticipated
performance characteristics (such as worth, drive speed, actuation
and insertion times), fail-safe features, etc. An analysis should be
provided to show that the reactivity control system will function
properly in all operational states of the reactor and that it will main-
tain its reactor shutdown capability under all foreseeable accident
conditions, including failures of the control system itself. Foresee-
able ageing effects due to deterioration of properties as well as
irradiation damage should be taken into account.
For ESNII systems the possible use of passive shutdown systems
should be demonstrated in terms of reliability of the system to
operate under all the conditions identiﬁed. In addition, an adequate
means of testing the system should be presented.
An analysis should be provided demonstrating that the nuclear
design and core nuclear performance are acceptable throughout its
anticipated core cycle. The analysis should include the steady state
and the dynamic nuclear and thermal characteristics of the reactor.
Basic information on the nuclear design should include:
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a) Core conﬁguration and composition;
b) Horizontal and vertical distributions of the neutron ﬂux in the
core at thermal neutron and fast neutron energy levels;
(c) The nuclear design bases, including nuclear and reactivity con-
trol limits such as limits on excess reactivity, fuel burnup,
reactivity feedback properties with regard to temperature, void,
etc., reactivity kinetics parameters, power distribution control
and reactivity insertion rates;
d) The anticipated effectiveness and the position of control ele-
ments during core lifetime; minimum shutdown capacity and
reactivity worth of individual core components (fuel elements,
irradiation devices, etc.).
e) Activation products generated in the coolant and in the struc-
tures.
The basic information should be supported by reference to the
omputational methods and codes used, to experimental veriﬁca-
ion of the basic input data, or to other information that supports
he validity of the nuclear properties.
Information should be given to demonstrate that in all opera-
ional states, the thermal and hydraulic design provides an adequate
apacity for core cooling to keep the reactor fuel in a thermally
afe condition, and that an adequate thermal safety margin will
e maintained to prevent or to minimize fuel damage under acci-
ent conditions. The design bases, the thermal and hydraulic design
or the reactor core and attendant structures, and the interface
equirements for the thermal and hydraulic design of the reac-
or coolant system (ﬂow, pressure, and temperature distributions,
ith the speciﬁcation of limiting values and their comparison with
esign limits) should be described together with the analytical
ools, methods, and computer codes. Veriﬁcation and validation
nformation together with uncertainties associated with calcu-
ations of the thermal and hydraulic parameters should also
e given.
For liquid metal systems speciﬁc information should be pre-
ented on the effect of sloshing of a free surface on the seismic
nd structural design of the reactor.
For ESNII systems the various aspects associated with the tran-
ient and steady-state behaviour of natural circulation cooling
hould be described. In particular, the effective transition to natu-
al circulation during transient operation should be demonstrated
gainst possible instabilities and consequences of possible ﬂow
eversal.
Information should be provided to show that all reactor materi-
ls that have been selected for the construction of safety relevant
tructures and components can withstand the nuclear, thermal, and
hemical environments to which they will be subjected, without
nacceptable worsening of the performance of the safety functions
f such structures and components. This includes the materials of
he primary vessel, the materials providing the core support and
old down structure and safety relevant reactor internals (such
s guides of the reactivity control mechanism) The information
hould be validated by reference to experimental measurements
nd experience.
Particularly relevant for innovative systems, in view of the
nvisaged long-life plants (60 years), the preliminary validation
rogramme should be completed by an in-service material surveil-
ance programme (periodic testing and inspection) carried out
o verify essential material properties should be described. This
s speciﬁcally important for heavy liquid metal cooled and gas
ooled concepts, for which the knowledge base for in-pile mate-
ial behaviour still needs to be complemented. As an example, for
ASTEF/MYRRHA, irradiation effects on material properties need
o be considered and monitored for components located in the
icinity of the spallation source, while for GFRs, change of mechan-
cal properties due to the possible absence of protective oxideg and Design 300 (2016) 452–466 457
ﬁlms and penetration of helium into the cladding need to be
surveyed.
3.5. Chapter 5: Reactor coolant and connected systems
This chapter of the SAR should provide a description of the
reactor coolant system and its associated systems. The description
should contain the main design characteristics and performance
characteristics (IAEA, 2012a,b).
The design and operation of the primary cooling system should be
described in detail to demonstrate that the reactor coolant system
will retain its required level of structural integrity in both opera-
tional states and accident conditions. The design and performance
characteristics of the main components (pumps, heat exchangers)
should be tabulated. The materials of which the components are
made and the effects of irradiation, corrosion/erosion on these
materials should be speciﬁed. For the innovative nature of ESNII
systems the design and operation of the handling of large compo-
nents (primary pumps, heat exchangers) have also to be covered
since it may  be necessary to replace such components in case of
their failure.
The reactor vessel, together with in-service environmental
factors such as corrosion/erosion, fatigue, creep-fatigue, embrit-
tlement, thermal stress cycling, and ageing effects, should be
described. A description and justiﬁcation should be provided of the
results of the detailed analytical and numerical stress evaluations
and studies of engineering mechanics and fracture mechanics of all
components subjected to normal conditions, including shutdown
conditions, and postulated accident loads.
Particularly relevant for liquid metal ESNII systems is the
description of methods utilized for leak detection and measures
to practically eliminate the loss of the primary coolant to ensure
an adequate cooling of the reactor core in the unlikely event of a
reactor vessel leak and avoid power excursions given the positive
coolant void reactivity feedback.
The design and operation of the secondary cooling system should
be described in detail. The design and performance characteris-
tics of the main components (pumps, valves, heat exchangers,
piping) should be tabulated. A ﬂow and instrumentation diagram
should be included, as well as drawings of the main components.
The materials the components are made of and corrosion con-
trol measures should be speciﬁed. Ageing effects should also be
discussed.
If the reactor uses a closed intermediate cooling system between
the primary and the secondary cooling system, this should also be
described.
The chemistry data for the primary, secondary and intermediate
cooling systems should be presented, including the effects of irra-
diation of the primary coolant, potential interaction with air and/or
water, and chemical toxicity.
The assumptions and analysis techniques used to determine the
maximum credible pressure transient as consequence of sodium-
water reaction should be described. The analysis of components
should demonstrate that they are designed to withstand those pres-
sure transient.
For ESNII systems the design and operation of the decay heat
removal system (DHR),  including the ultimate heat sink, should be
described in detail. The design and performance characteristics of
the main components should be tabulated. A ﬂow and instrumen-
tation diagram should be included, as well as drawings of the main
components. The materials of which the components are made
should be speciﬁed; the effects of irradiation, if any, and any corro-
sion and ageing effects should be discussed, as well as unfavourable
environmental conditions for the ultimate heat sink.
The design and operation of the fuel handling and storage system
(storage pools) should be described in detail. A detailed engineering
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esign description is expected that should demonstrate the ade-
uate safety level of the systems. This includes:
 Adequate cooling of fuel to be ensured during handling and stor-
age.
 Storage arrangements to have adequate margins to avoid crit-
icality events in the whole fuel route based on the use of
demonstrated techniques and validated analyses.
 Adequate conﬁnement of the radioactive products.
In ESNII systems, the design and the operation of the primary
oolant make-up and puriﬁcation system should be described in
etail, including the procedures for exchange of cold/hot traps
nd the shielding used to protect personnel during this opera-
ion. The relevant chemistry control and chemistry data of the
oolant should be presented (e.g. details of coolant treatment, oxy-
en control processes). The means for monitoring performance
nd renewing the system’s ability to purify the coolant should be
escribed.
For Liquid Metal Cooled Reactors the cover gas system should be
escribed in detail including the treatment of radioactive gasses or
olatile substances.
For the MYRRHA/FASTEF, the design and operation of the accel-
rator should be described in detail. The requirements (beam
nergy, intensity, shape/proﬁle, as well as availability), design and
erformance characteristics of the main components should be pre-
ented.
Depending on the safety functions of reactor coolant and
onnected systems, the components of the systems may  need emer-
ency power supply in case of accident. These needs should be
escribed for the concerned systems. Considerations may  also need
o be given to implemented provisions for emergency water supply
rom outside the site.
The general arrangement of the buildings and mainly the reactor
uilding should be provided.
The qualiﬁcation of equipment, related to these systems should
e discussed. The operator should also present how the qualiﬁca-
ion will be ensured during the life of the plant (ageing aspects).
.6. Chapter 6: Engineered safety features
Engineered safety features are provided to protect from antici-
ated operational occurrence events expected to occur during the
ifetime of the plant and to mitigate the consequence of postulated
ccidents in spite of the fact that these accidents are very unlikely
IAEA, 2004, 2012a,b). In this chapter, the types, locations, and func-
ions of the engineered safety features provided in the proposed
uclear plant should be identiﬁed and described in sufﬁcient detail
o permit an adequate evaluation of the performance capability of
hese features.
The design basis and various modes of operation of the engi-
eered safety features should be discussed in detail. The anticipated
perational occurrence events and postulated accidents for which
hese systems are designed should be presented, and analyses
hould be provided to demonstrate that the systems fulﬁl the pre-
cribed functional requirements. The subsystems that are essential
or the proper operation of the engineered safety features should
e described (e.g. uninterruptible power supply for the decay heat
emoval system). The extent to which the engineered safety fea-
ures are automated and the conditions for which manual override
s warranted should be clearly indicated.The information should include:
(a) Descriptions of the experience (if any), tests at simulated acci-
dent conditions, or conservative extrapolations from existingg and Design 300 (2016) 452–466
knowledge that supports the concept selection upon which the
operation of the feature is based;
(b) Considerations of component reliability, system interdepen-
dency, redundancy, diversity, and separation of components or
portions of systems, etc., associated with ensuring that the fea-
ture will accomplish its intended purpose and will function for
the period required;
(c) Provisions for test, inspection, and surveillance to ensure that
the feature will be dependable and effective upon demand;
(d) Evidence that the material used will withstand the postulated
accident environment, including radiation levels, will not inter-
fere with it or other engineered safety features.
For ESNII systems engineered safety features include:
3.6.1. Decay heat removal system
This subsection should complement the description in Section
3.5 on the decay heat removal system and associated ﬂuid systems
with relevant information on the performance capability to protect
from anticipated operational occurrence events expected to occur
during the lifetime of the plant and to mitigate the consequence
of postulated accidents. The actuation logic should be described
subsequently in the section on protection systems (cf. Section 3.7)
and need not be described here.
3.6.2. Containment systems
This subsection should present relevant information on the con-
tainment systems incorporated to localize the effects of internal
events and internal/external hazards, and should include, among
others:
(a) the heat removal systems of the containment;
b) the containment isolation system;
(c) the leakage control systems;
d) the protection of the containment against pressure disruption
(overpressure, underpressure);
(e) control of combustible gases, and ﬁre hazards in the contain-
ment.
For GFRs, information on treatment of non-condensable gases
should be present. For Liquid Metal Cooled Reactors, there are
generally no events that discharge the decay heat inside the
containment. The Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Sys-
tem (HVACS) is to maintain the required temperature in normal
operation while no engineered safety features are necessary for
containment decay heat removal.
3.6.3. Habitability systems
This subsection should present relevant information on the hab-
itability systems. The habitability systems are the engineered safety
features, systems, equipment, supplies, and procedures provided
to ensure that essential plant personnel can remain at their posts,
including those in the main and supplementary control rooms, and
can take actions to operate the plant safely in operational states and
to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions. The
habitability systems for the control room should include shielding,
air puriﬁcation systems, control of climatic conditions and stor-
age capacity for food and water as may  be required. The issue
of multi-unit/module conﬁgurations, where each reactor operates
independently of the others, but that are managed from a single
control room, should be considered.3.6.4. Systems to mitigate the consequences of a core melt
This subsection should present relevant information on systems
conceived to mitigate the consequences of a core melt, avoid-
ing potential re-criticality phenomena with mechanical energetic
eerin
r
e
s
3
t
s
m
a
s
h
–
–
–
s
o
t
c
s
s
t
e
b
i
c
a
b
–
–
–
–
–
c
–
–
–
–
–
–
p
e
eL. Ammirabile et al. / Nuclear Engin
eleases and guaranteeing heat removal. These include possible
xternal or internal core catcher or speciﬁc core melt discharge
ystems like the Fuel Assembly with Inner Duct Structure (FAIDUS).
.7. Chapter 7: Instrumentation and control
This chapter of the SAR should provide information regarding
he instrumentation and control systems of all safety systems and
afety-related systems, structures, components, and other equip-
ent. Particular emphasis should be given to those instruments
nd associated equipment that affect reactor safety. The complete
eparation between control system and protection system shall be
ighlighted and demonstrated. This includes:
 Safety-related instrumentation;
 Control systems that constitute the protection systems;
 Systems relied upon by operators to monitor plant conditions
and to shut the plant down and maintain it in a safe shutdown
state after a design basis accident.
Additionally, information should also be provided on non-
afety-related equipment used to control the plant in normal
peration whose failure will not impair the proper operation of
he safety-related instrumentation and control systems or create
hallenges not already considered in the safety analysis of the plant.
All instrumentation and control systems and supporting
ystems (with emphasis on safety systems and safety-related
ystems), including alarm, communication and display instrumen-
ation, should be listed, and considerations of instrumentation
rrors should be included (US NRC, 1978).
The analysis of regulating systems and instrumentation should
e provided, particularly considerations of regulating system-
nduced transients which, if not terminated in a timely manner,
ould result in fuel damage, radiation release, or other public haz-
rd.
The instrumentation and control systems should include but not
e limited to:
 Protection systems including the shutdown systems and the
actuation of DHR systems (for reactor and accelerator);
 Actuation systems for engineered safety features;
 Safety-related display instrumentation;
 Control systems not required for safety;
 Control rooms including the emergency control room (in
multi-unit/module conﬁgurations where each reactor operates
independently of the others, but they are managed from a single
control room must be considered).
Instrumentation and monitoring systems required for safety
ould include, if necessary:
 system needed for the management of severe accidents;
 core monitoring system, including:
o clad rupture detection and clad failure localization;
o ﬂow blockage detection system
o neutron ﬂux monitoring;
o temperature monitoring;
 leak detection systems;
 monitoring systems for vibrations;
 protective interlock systems;
 for FASTEF/MYRRHA the accelerator I&C system.For ESNII systems, it should be demonstrated that high tem-
erature operating conditions of fast reactors and the adverse
nvironments of liquid metal cooled reactors as well as ageing
ffects and obsolescence of components have been considered ing and Design 300 (2016) 452–466 459
the design, especially for those components that cannot readily be
replaced (IAEA, 2012a,b).
3.8. Chapter 8: Electric power
This chapter of the SAR should describe the electric power
system, with the emphasis on its dependability and relationship
to safety. The electric power system is the source of power for
the reactor coolant pumps, accelerator (in case of an Accelera-
tor Driven System), and other auxiliaries during normal operation
and for the protection system and engineered safety features
during anticipated operational occurrences and accident condi-
tions. The information in this chapter should be directed toward
establishing the functional adequacy of the safety-related electric
power systems and ensuring that these systems have adequate
redundancy, independence, and testability in conformance with
applicable criteria. The descriptions should be supported by ade-
quate diagrams. The adequacy of each power supply should be
demonstrated, and ageing effects that could affect safety should
be discussed (IAEA, 2004).
A section should be dedicated to the off-site electrical power
systems providing a description of the features for control and pro-
tection at the interconnection to the on-site power system. Special
emphasis should be put on all design provisions used to protect the
plant from off-site electrical disturbances and to maintain power
supply to in-plant auxiliaries.
For innovative systems, considerations may  also need to be
given to implemented provisions for the long-term supply of off-
site power in case of loss of off-site power or blackout in congruence
with applicable regulatory requirements.
Similarly, a section should be dedicated to the on-site electrical
power systems. This section should provide relevant information
on the plant speciﬁc alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC)
power system. It should include a description of the on-site AC and
DC power systems, including the diesel systems and batteries, and
the power requirements for each plant AC load should be identiﬁed
as well as an evaluation of the long-term discharge capacity of the
batteries.
The description of power systems related to non-typical LWR
components (e.g. electro-magnetic pumps, compressors, blowers)
need to ensure the adequate conﬁdence about their reliability and
capacity throughout the postulated events.
3.9. Chapter 9: Auxiliary systems
This chapter of the SAR should provide information concern-
ing the auxiliary systems included in the facility (US  NRC, 1978;
IAEA, 2004, 2012a,b). Those systems that are essential for the safe
shutdown of the plant or the protection of the health and safety
of the public should be identiﬁed. The description of each sys-
tem, the design bases for the system and for critical components,
a safety assessment demonstrating how the system satisﬁes the
requirements of the design basis, information on the testing and
inspection to be performed to verify the capability and depend-
ability of the system, and information on the instrumentation and
control system required should be provided. In cases where auxil-
iary systems are not related to the protection of the public against
exposure to radiation or other hazards, enough information should
be provided to allow understanding of the design and function of
the auxiliary system. Emphasis should be placed on those aspects
that might affect the reactor and its safety features or contribute
to the control of radioactivity or other hazard. The capability of the
system to function without compromising the safe operation of the
plant under both normal operating or transient situations should
be clearly shown by the information provided, i.e., through a failure
analysis.
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For those systems, foreseeable ageing effects that could affect
afety should also be discussed.
For liquid metal reactors, particular attention should be given
o the ﬁre protection systems (SARGEN IV, 2014), when the coolant
s sodium, given its highly exothermic reactivity in contact with air
r water. This section should provide relevant information on the
re protection systems, including information on procedures and
aintenance activities, to demonstrate that the provisions made
nsure that the plant design provides adequate ﬁre protection.
he design should include adequate provisions for defence-in-
epth in the event of a ﬁre, and should provide ﬁre prevention,
re detection, ﬁre warning, ﬁre suppression, and ﬁre containment.
onsideration should be given to the selection of materials, the
hysical separation of redundant systems, the seismic qualiﬁca-
ion of equipment and the use of barriers to segregate redundant
rains.
The extent to which the design has been successful in providing
dequate protection against ﬁre and potential explosions should
e assessed and it may  refer to other sections of the SAR for this
nformation (e.g. Section 3.15 on safety analysis). Where appropri-
te, the provisions to ensure the ﬁre safety of personnel may  also
e described in this section.
Other plant auxiliary systems may  include:
 Auxiliary coolant (sodium, lead, lead-bismuth, helium) systems.
This section should provide relevant information on the auxiliary
coolant system to receive, purify and transfer all coolant used in
the plant, including information on procedures and maintenance
activities.
 Process auxiliaries, including inert gas receiving and processing;
 Heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems;
 Other auxiliary systems (i.e. the communication systems, the
lighting systems, the cooling water system, the starting system,
the lubrication system, etc.);
 Storage tank for the coolant.
.10. Chapter 10: Power conversion systems/research reactor
tilization
This chapter of the SAR should provide information concerning
he power conversion system envisaged for the plant and, in case
f MYRRHA/FASTEF design, the expected experimental use of the
esearch reactor. For purposes of this chapter, the power conversion
ystem (heat utilization system) should include the steam system
nd turbine generator units of an indirect cycle reactor plant, as
eﬁned by the secondary (LFR) or tertiary (SFR, GFR) coolant sys-
em, or alternative gas (e.g. supercritical CO2) conversion systems
US NRC, 1978; IAEA, 2004).
While some parts of the power conversion system have little
elationship to protection of the public against exposure to radi-
tion and other hazards, the SAR should deal with those aspects
laying a more signiﬁcant safety role. Enough information should
e provided to allow understanding in broad terms of what the
ower conversion system is, but emphasis should be on those
spects of design and operation that do or might affect the reactor
nd its safety features or contribute toward the control of radioac-
ivity or other hazard. The capability of the system to function
ithout compromising directly or indirectly the safety of the plant
nder both normal operating and transient situations should be
hown by the information provided. Where appropriate, the eval-
ation of radiological aspects of normal operation of the steam and
ower conversion system and subsystems should be summarized
n this chapter and presented in detail in Sections 3.11 and 3.12.
In case of MYRRHA/FASTEF design, this chapter should provide
nformation demonstrating that provisions have been made to
nsure that the experimental facilities and experiments are withing and Design 300 (2016) 452–466
the safety criteria established for the research reactor, the staff, and
the public (IAEA, 2012a,b).
This chapter should provide a description of the design as well
as a safety analysis for all experimental facilities associated directly
or indirectly with the reactor. The method of review and approval
for new experimental facilities together with the administrative
procedures and controls to be employed should be described as
well.
3.11. Chapter 11: Radioactive waste management
This chapter should demonstrate the adequacy of the measures
to control, collect, handle, process, store, and dispose for the safe
management of radioactive waste of all types that is generated
throughout the lifetime of the plant and also consider the options
for the safe predisposal management of waste. It should refer to
the design description of the plant systems for the treatment of
radioactive waste provided in the SAR chapter on description and
conformance to the design of plant systems (IAEA, 2004).
A short description of the main sources of solid, liquid, and
gaseous waste and estimates of their generation rate in compliance
with the design requirements should be given. This chapter should
also provide information on the characteristics of the accumulation
rates and the quantities, conditions and forms of radioactive waste
with different states of aggregation and activity level, for normal
and anticipated operational occurrences conditions of operation
and for accident conditions. The methods and technical means for
its processing and/or conditioning, storage and transport as well
as the instrumentation used to monitor the release of radioactive
wastes should also be dealt with.
3.12. Chapter 12: Radiation protection
This chapter should provide information on the policy, strat-
egy, methods, and provisions for radiation protection. The expected
occupational radiation exposures during normal operation and
anticipated operational occurrences, including measures to avoid
and restrict exposure, should also be described (US NRC, 1978; IAEA,
2004, 2012a,b).
The description should either include a brief description of the
ways in which adequate provisions for radiation protection have
been incorporated into the design or refer to other sections of the
SAR, where this information can be obtained. It should be explained
how the basic protection measures of time, distance and shielding
have been considered. It should be demonstrated that appropriate
design and operational arrangements have been made to reduce
the amount of unnecessary radiation sources.
It should provide information on facility and equipment design,
the planning and procedures programs, and the techniques and
practices employed by the applicant in meeting the standards for
protection against radiation.
Tentative sections include:
(a) Application of the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable)
principle;
b) Description of radiation sources;
(c) Design features for radiation protection;
d) Radiation monitoring;
(e) Radiation protection programme.
For Liquid Metal Cooled Reactors considerations need to addi-
tional radiation sources due to neutron capture by primary coolant
(in particular for liquid metal-cooled reactors, 24Na for sodium
and 210Po for lead-bismuth as well as lead) and those produced
in the proton-induced spallation reactions (for MYRRHA/FASTEF).
Potential transport and distribution to other plant systems should
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e identiﬁed together with the areas containing such systems
hat should be provided with controlled ventilation systems and
quipped with activity and leakage control features.
.13. Chapter 13: Conduct of operations
This chapter of the SAR should provide information relating to
he organizational structure and the way in which the operating
rganization will conduct the operations of the proposed nuclear
lant. This should include the stafﬁng, review, and audit of opera-
ions of the plant, operating procedures (incl. emergency operating
rocedures and accident management guidelines), maintenance,
esting and inspection, security aspects, and records and reports.
For innovative liquid metal fast reactors (in opaque, high tem-
erature, chemically adverse environment) particular attention
hould be dedicated to demonstrate the availability of reliable in-
ervice inspection & repair (ISI&R) capabilities (SARGEN IV, 2014)
o facilitate periodic examination and repair of the plant compo-
ents as a primarily prevention (DiD) measure that contributes to
ssurance of safety.
This section should also include information justifying the
ppropriateness of the plant in-service inspections, required to help
emonstrate that the plant meets the speciﬁed standards, satisﬁes
he inspection criteria adopted, and remains capable of perform-
ng the required safety functions. In particular, emphasis should be
laced on the adequacy of the in-service inspections of the integrity
f the primary coolant system, owing to their importance to safety
nd the severity of the possible consequences of failure. For ﬁrst-
f-a-kind plants, a description of the techniques implemented or
 reference to complementary documents describing those tech-
iques should be indicated.
.14. Chapter 14: Plant commissioning
This chapter of the SAR should provide information on the ini-
ial test program for structures, systems, components, and design
eatures for both the nuclear portion of the plant and the bal-
nce of the plant (IAEA, 2004, 2012a,b). The operating organization
hould demonstrate that the plant will be suitable for service
rior to its entering the operational phase. The process that the
perating organization has adopted to demonstrate this suitabil-
ty should be presented here. The operating organization should
escribe the tests intended to validate the plant’s performance
gainst the design prior to the operation of the plant. Among others,
he commissioning programme should conﬁrm that the separate
lant items will perform within their speciﬁcations and that in the
arious safety systems they function together to ensure that the
ystem’s safety functions are reliably performed. In addition, the
perating procedures should be validated to the extent practicable
s part of the commissioning programme, with the participation of
he future operating personnel. The information provided should
ddress major phases of the test program, including preoperational
ests, initial fuel loading and initial criticality, low-power tests,
nd power-ascension tests. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
PSAR) should describe the scope of the applicant’s initial test pro-
ram. The PSAR should also describe the applicant’s general plans
or accomplishing the test program in sufﬁcient detail to show that
ue consideration has been given to matters that normally require
dvance planning.
A particular attention needs to be paid to components and
echnical solutions of innovative nature, speciﬁcally if their per-
ormance cannot be fully validated by reference to experimental
easurements and experience. A graded approach to testing
hould be established so that the plant is not totally dependent
n the performance of untested safety equipment, and there is
roper planning and instrumentation coupled with planned safetyg and Design 300 (2016) 452–466 461
and acceptance criteria, recovery actions, and validation of ana-
lytical predictions. Speciﬁc areas to be addressed in the testing
programme include:
• Decay heat removal systems.
To demonstrate the predicted performance of the systems
including the establishment of the adequate in-vessel coolant
ﬂow and air ﬂow pathways. The adequate transition to in-vessel
natural circulation cooling (Section 3.4) should also be tested.
• Reactor shutdown mechanisms.
Besides the normal assessment of active systems tests in the
ESNII reactor are required to test innovative passive/inherent
reactor shutdown systems to establish an acceptable conﬁdence
level.
• Reactor passive response.
The reactor passive response is an important part of the safety
test plan to assess plant behaviour under postulated transi-
ents and conﬁrm the reliability of calculated feedbacks. Speciﬁc
fast reactor tests must be taken into account in case of basic
differences with current LWRs. Envisaged tests include loss-of-
ﬂow, transient over-power, loss-of-heat-sink accident tests. Tests
should cover all power and ﬂow conditions provided that they do
not threaten the plant integrity.
For MYRRHA/FASTEF, dedicated preoperational, low power, and
power-ascension tests need to be devised for its sub-critical mode
of operation.
3.15. Chapter 15: Safety analysis
This chapter should provide a description of the results of
the safety analyses performed to assess the safety of a plant in
response to postulated initiating events (PIEs), internal and exter-
nal hazards based on safety criteria and authorized limits on
radioactive releases. These analyses include deterministic safety
analyses (US NRC, 1978) used in support of normal operation, anal-
yses of design basis accidents (anticipated operational occurrences
and postulated accidents), design extension conditions including
selected severe accidents, and highlights provided by probabilis-
tic safety analyses (PSA) (IAEA, 2004, 2012a,b; US  NRC, 2007a,b).
The safety analyses should also include the demonstration of the
practical elimination of identiﬁed unacceptable situations. The
safety analyses should proceed in parallel with the design pro-
cess, with iteration between the two activities. The scope and
the level of detail of the analyses should increase as the design
progresses so that the ﬁnal safety analyses reﬂect the ﬁnal plant
design.
As and if necessary, speciﬁcally for innovative reactor concepts,
veriﬁcation and validation of computer codes and data on which the
safety demonstration is relying on need to follow together with the
progress of the design.
With reference to the principles and objectives of nuclear safety
and radiation protection applicable to the particular plant design, as
previously identiﬁed in Section 3.1, the detailed acceptance crite-
ria speciﬁc to structures, systems and components for different
classes of events and types of analyses should be speciﬁed. These
acceptance criteria should be such that frequent events should have
minor consequences and events that may  result in severe conse-
quences should be of a very low probability. A clear description of
the containment barriers and their behaviour during the transients
should be given.
The SAR should demonstrate that the possible PIEs, i.e. events
identiﬁed during design as capable of leading to anticipated oper-
ational occurrences or accident conditions, are identiﬁed and
classiﬁed in a systematic way that has led to the development of a
comprehensive list of events.
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Similarly, all foreseeable internal and external hazards, includ-
ng the potential for human induced events, affecting directly or
ndirectly the safety of the nuclear power plant, should be identiﬁed
nd their effects should be evaluated. Hazards should be considered
or determination of the means to mitigate the consequences and
or generation of the additional loadings for use in the design of
elevant items important to safety for the plant.
The use of methods like OPT or Master Logic Diagram (MLD)
SARGEN IV, 2012) could provide a useful means to accomplish this
dentiﬁcation process, including the veriﬁcation of its comprehen-
iveness and exhaustiveness.
Typically, the list of PIEs to be addressed in the SAR will cover
esign basis condition accidents (anticipated operational occur-
ences and postulated accidents). It should also include results from
he analysis of design extension conditions performed. The list of
IEs should cover all stages of plant normal operations (full power,
educed power, shutdown, refuelling, etc.). The internal hazards
like ﬂooding, internal ﬁres, etc.) and external hazards (earthquake,
ooding, airplane crash, etc.) and combination of events (complex
equences, lessons learned from Fukushima accident) should be
onsidered.
Some of the design basis accidents or design extension condi-
ions with postulated additional faults (aggravating failures; ATWS;
evere accidents) involving signiﬁcant core degradation and/or off-
ite radioactive releases may  be further developed. The results of
hese severe accident analyses should also be included in the SAR
o the extent that they are needed to design the plant or system
r to develop the plant accident management programme and to
upport emergency preparedness.
It has been anticipated that the principle of practically elimi-
ated situations will be applied for some accident scenarios in the
afety assessment of ESNII concepts (WENRA, 2013). Speciﬁc situa-
ions, whose consequences can lead to early or large radioactive
elease and which cannot be managed by the design at accept-
ble conditions, have to be practically eliminated by implemented
esign measures. These situations have to be demonstrated either
s physically impossible by design, or as extremely unlikely to arise
ith a high level of conﬁdence. Practically eliminated situations are
art of the residual risk. No design provisions are implemented for
itigation of practically eliminated situations and in this respect
ractically eliminated situations can be considered an exception in
he application of DiD principle (no design provisions for mitiga-
ion) since only prevention provisions are accounted for.
Events should be classiﬁed in accordance with their anticipated
requencies and types. The number of initiating events requiring
etailed analysis are then reduced to a set that includes the most
ounding cases in each of the various event groups credited in
he safety analyses, but that does not contain events with identi-
al system performance (such as in terms of timing, plant systems
esponse and radiological release fractions). Different event classes
re subject to different acceptance criteria for the safety analyses.
The approach adopted to take into account human actions in
he different types of safety analyses and the methods selected
o model these actions in each type of analysis should also be
escribed.
The deterministic analyses performed to evaluate and justify
lant safety should then be described. Deterministic safety anal-
sis predicts the plant response to PIEs in speciﬁc predetermined
perational states. The deterministic analysis for design purposes
hould be conservative. The analysis of design extension conditions
s generally less conservative (best estimate analysis) than that of
esign basis accidents.The models and the computer codes used for the determinis-
ic analyses as well as the general assumptions made concerning
lant parameters, the operability of systems, including control sys-
ems (credited only if they worsen the event sequences), and theg and Design 300 (2016) 452–466
operators’ actions (if any) in the events should be described. A gen-
eral summary of the veriﬁcation and validation processes used for
the computer codes should be presented with reference to more
detailed topical reports.
An integrated review of the plant design and operational safety
should be presented, by means of PSA study, to complement the
results of the deterministic analyses and to give an indication of
the success of the deterministic design in achieving the design
objectives. Such approach would further contribute to provide a
documented substantiation that DiD strategy implemented in the
safety architecture is exhaustive, progressive, tolerant, forgiving
and balanced (SARGEN IV, 2012).
3.16. Chapter 16: Operational limits and conditions
This chapter of the SAR should contain the operational lim-
its and conditions important to safe reactor operation that have
been derived from the safety analysis (US NRC, 1978; IAEA, 2004,
2012a,b). Although practices concerning the explicit inclusion of
the Operational Limits & Conditions (OLCs) in the SAR differ among
countries, it is nevertheless important to demonstrate in the SAR
that the OLCs have been developed in a systematic way. The oper-
ational limits and conditions represent an envelope of parameters,
developed by the operating organization, that will protect the plant
and that will protect personnel and the public from exposure and
the environment from contamination if they are not exceeded.
The operational limits and conditions include safety limits, safety
system settings, limiting conditions for safe operation, and surveil-
lance and administrative requirements.
For ESNII systems, in view of the type of information provided in
this chapter it is neither possible nor prudent to produce ﬁnal tech-
nical speciﬁcations for the essential plant parameters in the PSAR.
Rather, for the PSAR, this chapter should be written to identify the
essential systems and parameters that require technical speciﬁca-
tions in an attempt to provide an insight to the expected operating
characteristics of the plant. The actual technical speciﬁcations and
the ﬁnal values for the essential parameters should be presented in
the FSAR.
3.17. Chapter 17: Management systems
This chapter should describe the management system, devel-
oped under the responsibility of the operating organization,
providing the items, services, and processes to which the manage-
ment system should apply to the proposed nuclear power plant,
throughout its operating time, and of the organizational structure
within which the activities are to be planned and implemented
including on-site and off-site issues (IAEA, 2004). The level of con-
trol and veriﬁcation of quality should also be deﬁned, and the
means available for achieving this level should be described. The
management system procedures should be consistent with the
requirements of the plant and its objectives, status and charac-
teristics, and the management system should be acceptable to the
regulatory body, ensuring conformance with the requirements for
every aspect of safety, thus establishing a strong safety culture
throughout the lifetime of the plant.
3.18. Chapter 18: Human factors engineering
This section of the SAR should provide a description of the
operating organization’s proposals to manage operational issues
that are affected by considerations of human factors, including the
continuing review (on the basis of, among others, operating expe-
rience feedback) and development of the measures in place (IAEA,
2004, 2012a,b). The principles of human factors engineering used
for taking into account all factors shaping human performance
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hat may  have an impact on the reliability of the operators’ per-
ormance should be outlined. A programme should describe the
rganizational provisions in place to ensure that operators are
ble to perform effectively in the main control room as well as
n other parts of the plant as required, under all operational cir-
umstances, including proposed shift schemes and rotations, the
ssessment of operators’ ﬁtness for duty and other issues related
o human factors. The speciﬁc design features of systems and equip-
ent that are intended to promote successful operator actions
human-system interfaces) should also be considered. A systematic
pproach for the development of personnel training should be also
ncluded.
.19. Chapter 19: Emergency preparedness
Future nuclear plants should be designed so that accidents are
ery unlikely at the very least, and are as near to impossible as
echnology allows (IAEA, 1992). Beyond this, plants must be able
o accommodate design extension conditions without harm to the
ublic so that only protective measures that are limited interms
f times and areas of application would be necessary and off-site
ontamination would be avoided. In addition, Generation IV Energy
ystems recognize the safety goal to “eliminate the need for offsite
mergency response” (GIF, 2014).
Besides the “technical justiﬁcations” or “safety goals”, other
egal requirements (either administrative rules, law, decree, or
ecurity considerations) can oblige the preparation of “Off-site
mergency response” which will obviously be proportionate to the
onsequences that have to be managed. It is obvious, that despite
he safety objectives content, i.e. even if the objective is the “zero
elease”, the 5th level of the DiD (i.e. mitigation provisions) should
e implemented (i.e. ready to be operated) (SARGEN IV, 2012).
This chapter should provide information on emergency pre-
aredness (IAEA, 2004), demonstrating in a reasonable manner
hat, in the event of an accident, all actions necessary for the protec-
ion of the public, workers and the plant could be taken, and that the
ecision making process for implementation of these actions would
e timely, disciplined, co-ordinated and effective. The emergency
reparedness arrangements should cover the full range of acci-
ents (in particular design extension conditions) that would have
ffects on the environment and the off-site areas where prepara-
ions for the implementation of protective measures are warranted.
he description should include information on the objectives and
trategies, organization and management, and should provide sufﬁ-
ient information to show how the practical goals of the emergency
lan will be met. Aspects related to multi-unit sites and co-located
acilities may  need to be again carefully considered.
.20. Chapter 20: Environmental aspects
Practices among countries may  vary with respect to the inclu-
ion of information on environmental aspects in the SAR. If this is
equired, this chapter (IAEA, 2004) should provide a brief descrip-
ion of the approach taken to assess the impact on the environment
f the construction of the plant, its operation under normal condi-
ions, and its decommissioning.
This chapter should include a section on radiological impacts
roviding a description of the measures that will be taken to control
ischarges to the environment of solid, liquid, and gaseous radioac-
ive efﬂuents; these discharges should be in accordance with the
LARA principle. The section should cover all aspects of site activ-
ty that have the potential to affect the radiological impacts of the
ite throughout the lifetime of the plant, including construction,
peration under normal conditions and decommissioning.
Another section should cover the non-radiological impacts cov-
ring all aspects of site activity that have the potential to affectg and Design 300 (2016) 452–466 463
throughout the lifetime of the plant, including construction, oper-
ation and decommissioning.
In particular, this section should provide a description of the
measures that will be taken to control discharges to the environ-
ment of any dangerous solid, liquid, and gaseous non-radioactive
efﬂuents.
3.21. Chapter 21: Decommissioning and end-of-life aspects
This chapter of the SAR should contain the proposals anticipated
at this point for the eventual decommissioning of the plant. The
capability for decommissioning the plant should be demonstrated
before initial criticality or before plant operation starts. It should
be periodically updated to allow for an increasing level of detail
and to reﬂect developments in the strategy for decommissioning
(IAEA, 2004, 2012a,b). The targeted status of the plant after decom-
missioning should be given (i.e. “return to the grass” or keeping the
buildings)
This chapter should illustrate the decommissioning concept
developed for the plant taking into account:
a) Design solutions that minimize the amount and the radiotox-
icity of waste material produced, optimize, and ensure safety
during decommissioning;
b) Consideration of the type, volume, and activity of radioactive
waste produced during the operational and decommissioning
phases;
c) Identiﬁed options for decommissioning and needs of particular
installations (e.g. to process the coolant);
d) Planning, phasing, or staging of the decommissioning process,
including appropriate surveillance requirements throughout
the process;
e) Adequate documentary control and maintenance of suitable and
sufﬁcient records;
(f) Anticipated organizational changes, including provisions in
place to preserve the institutional knowledge that will be
needed at the decommissioning phase.
For liquid metal reactors additional considerations should be
done in relation to the processing of the metal coolant (sodium,
lead or lead-bismuth) in particular as concerns cleaning treatments
to reduce the level of coolant activation (SARGEN IV, 2014) and the
chemical releases in the environment.
4. Summary
Recommendations and considerations on the possible format
and content of a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) are given in this paper
to support a request to the regulatory body for authorization to
construct and/or operate an ESNII demonstrator or prototype. They
are based on the work performed in the Euratom FP7 SARGEN IV
project to review the critical safety features of the innovative reac-
tor concepts developed under ESNII (SARGEN IV, 2013). Though the
structure and content of a SAR generally differ among countries, a
general proposal has been developed. The approach followed was  to
adopt as far as possible the format of the current practices for LWR
based on the US NRC Reg Guide 1.70 together with IAEA publica-
tion GS-G-4.1 and to identify those chapters whose subjects need to
be adapted to the speciﬁc design, presenting some considerations
on their content. Compared to conventional LWRs, the innovative
nature of ESNII reactor concepts requires the identiﬁcation and
description of the safety objectives and the engineering design
requirements of the structures, systems, components, and other
equipment important to safety (cf. also Table 1). For such innovative
plant designs, characterized by new coolants, new technology, and
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Table 1
List of topics to be possibly also taken into account in the content of SAR for the individual ESNII concepts. The list is meant as an example and not meant to be complete.
Chapter Chapter name SFR LFR GFR MYRRHA/FASTEF
1 General design
aspects, safety
objectives and
engineering design
requirements
• Information on new safety features and technical solutions differing signiﬁcantly from Gen-II/III experience
•  Safety objectives and engineering design requirements to be described
•  Listing of R&D programmes to cover new technological areas
2 Site characteristics • Possible combination of hazards
•  Multi-unit plants and co-location of reactor and process heat facilities to be
considered
• Aspects related to
combined
operation of
accelerator and
reactor
3  Design of systems,
structures and
components
– • Analysis and/or testing program should be presented to demonstrate that design
margins are available for those SSCs whenever current design codes and standards
are not applicable
4 Reactor • Analysis of effect
of sloshing of free
surface on seismic
and structural
design
• Analysis of effect
of sloshing of free
surface on seismic
and structural
design
– • Analysis of effect
of sloshing of free
surface on seismic
and structural
design
•  Reliability and testing of passive shutdown systems
•  Analysis of transient and steady-state behaviour of natural circulation cooling
•  Material surveillance programme (periodic testing and inspection) to be developed in view of long-life cores and
incomplete knowledge base on material behaviour (the latter relevant for LFR, GFR, and FASTEF)
5 Reactor coolant
and connected
systems
• In congruence with applicable regulatory requirement, considerations may  also need to be given to
implemented provisions for emergency water supply from outside the site
•  design and operation of the handling of large components (primary pumps, heat exchangers)
–  • New in-service
environmental
factors to be
discussed in detail
(e.g., Pb
embrittlement)
• New in-service
environmental
factors to be
discussed in detail
(e.g., absence of
oxide ﬁlms, He
embrittlement)
• Lead-bismuth
embrittlement
accelerator to be
described in detail
•  Description of methods to detect and practically eliminate loss of primary coolant
•  Design and operation of the intermediate cooling system
• Mitigation of
consequences of
sodium-water
reaction
– – –
•  Design and operation of the decay heat removal system
•  Design and operation of the primary make-up and puriﬁcation system
•  Description of the
cover gas system
• Description of the
cover gas system
• Description of the
cover gas system
–  – – design and
operation of the
accelerator
6 Engineered safety
features
– – • Treatment of
non-condensable
gases in
containment
design
–
•  Description of dedicated systems to manage severe accidents
7 Instrumentation
and control (I&C)
• Multi-unit/module conﬁgurations where each reactor operates independently of
the  others, but they are managed from a single control room to be considered
• Accelerator I&C
system to be
described in detail
•  The shutdown
systems
•  Leak detection
system
• Activation of DHR
systems
• The shutdown
systems
• Leak detection
system
• Activation of DHR
systems
• The shutdown
systems
• Leak detection
system
•  Activation of DHR
systems
• The shutdown
systems
•  Leak detection
system
•  Activation of DHR
systems
•  Consideration of high operating temperatures, ageing and obsolesce of components
8  Electric power • In congruence with applicable regulatory requirements, considerations may  also need to be given to
implemented provisions for the long-term off-site power supply in case of loss of off-site power or blackout
•  Reliability and capacity of power systems for non-typical LWR  components
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Table  1 (Continued)
Chapter Chapter name SFR LFR GFR MYRRHA/FASTEF
9 Auxiliary systems • Fire protection
system
sodium-air/water
interaction
management
systems
• Fire protection
system
• Fire protection
system
• Fire protection
system
•  Auxiliary coolant system
• Inert gas
receiving and
processing
• Inert gas
receiving and
processing
• Inert gas
receiving and
processing
10  Power conversion
systems/research
reactor utilization
• Steam or gas
power cycle
• Steam or gas
power cycle
• Steam or gas
power cycle
• Expected use of
research reactor
11  Radioactive waste
management
–
12 Radiation
protection
• Radionuclides
induced due to
neutron capture
(24Na in particular)
to be considered
• Radionuclides
induced due to
neutron capture
(210Po in particular)
to be considered
– • Radionuclides
induced due to
neutron capture
(210Po in
particular) and in
proton-induced
spallation reactions
to be considered
13  Conduct of
operations
• Availability of
reliable in-service
inspection and
repair capabilities
• Availability of
reliable in-service
inspection and
repair capabilities
• Availability of
reliable in-service
inspection and
repair capabilities
14 Plant
commissioning
•  Particular attention needs to be paid to components and technical solutions of innovative nature, speciﬁcally if
their  performance cannot be fully validated by reference to experimental measurements and experience.
•  graded approach to testing with plant not relying on untested safety systems
Safety test plan for:
• Decay heat
removal systems
• Reactor
shutdown system
• Reactor passive
response
Safety test plan for:
• Decay heat
removal systems
• Reactor
shutdown system
• Reactor passive
response
Safety test plan for:
• Decay heat
removal systems
• Reactor
shutdown system
• Reactor passive
response
Safety test plan for:
• Decay heat
removal systems
• Reactor
shutdown system
• Dedicated
preoperational,
low-power, and
power-ascension
tests need to be
devised for its
sub-critical mode
of operation
15  Safety analysis • Veriﬁcation and validation of computer codes and data for assessment of innovative features
•  Use of methods like OPT or Master Logic Diagram (MLD) to identify PIEs in comprehensive and exhaustive way
•  Principle of practically eliminated situations needs to be anticipated for some accident scenarios
•  Integrated review of plant design and operational safety by means of PSA study to complement deterministic
study and verify that DiD strategy implemented in the safety architecture is exhaustive, progressive, tolerant,
forgiving, and balanced
16  Operational limits
and conditions
• Identify the essential systems and parameters that require technical speciﬁcations
•  Operational limits and condition will be more stringent and conservative for ﬁrst-of-a-kind plants of ESNII
17  Management
systems
–
18 Human factors
engineering
–
19 Emergency
preparedness
• Information on the implemented mitigation provisions (the 5th level of DiD) to be included
20  Environmental
aspects
–
21 Decommissioning
and end-of-life
• Processing and/or
cleaning to reduce
• Processing and/or
cleaning to reduce
act
coo
con
– • Processing and/or
cleaning to reduce
n
L
s
paspects activation of the
coolant to be
consideredew safety issues, it is even more important than for conventional
WRs to address clearly all aspects in the SAR, relevant to safety in
uch a way that the regulatory body will be able to evaluate inde-
endently the safety of the plant. In this respect, it is recommendedivation of the
lant to be
sidered
activation of the
coolant to be
consideredthat parts of the SAR be submitted to the regulatory body at an
early stage and in accordance with an agreed timetable. This will
permit a smoother review process and help prevent unnecessary
delays.
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